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This thesis examines the role of the United States in
United Nations military operations. In a future that will
likely include more instances of U.N. security operations
and a U.S. military having to make do with less resources,
collective security operations are a logical choice for U.S.
decision-makers. The study begins with a discussion of six
types of U.N. military operations, ranging in intensity from
humanitarian aid to enforcement and punishment. The study
also provides a decision model that accounts for the effects
of elite and popular consensus domestically and
internationally on the collective security process; Iraq and
Bosnia act as illustrative examples. The study then
examines the roles played by the U.S. Navy and intelligence
community in collective security. In summary, the study
concludes that the U.S. military is best suited for
operations at either extreme of the collective spectrum. In
other instances, limited action by the U.S. Navy or
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study begins by discussing six levels of U.N.
military operations, ranging from most peaceful to most
violent: level 1 humanitarian aid, level 2 separation of
forces, level 3 law and order, level 4 use of limited force,
level 5 enforcement, and level 6 punishment . Briefly,
humanitarian aid missions need almost no force, level 2
separation of forces and level 3 law and order require
minimal force, level 4 use of limited force provides for
just that, and level 5 enforcement and level 6 punishment,
at least in the Gulf War, allow for "all means necessary."
Humanitarian aid may be broken into three types:
- a host nation extends an invitation for assistance,
- assistance is given against the wishes of host,
- a host nation's civil authority has evaporated.
Providing humanitarian aid of the first type need not be
explained further. However, the second and third instances
are more controversial. It is in the U.S.'s best interests
to be sensitive to the concerns of developing nations, who
are acutely aware of threats to their national sovereignty
and international prestige. The U.N. already contains a
group of nations who regularly perform peacekeeping
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operations; these last two types of humanitarian aid seem
best left to them- -likewise, the "middle" levels of U.N.
military operations described below.
Separation of forces is the traditional peacekeeping
mission. Law and order missions, which have been authorized
only rarely in the past, guarantee the integrity of a
government whose authority has evaporated. In the future,
if the United Nations becomes more involved in nations'
internal disputes, peacekeepers will require more forceful
means. Therefore, the use of limited force, a likely new
peacekeeping category, may gain in prominence.
At the extreme of collective security are enforcement
and punishment operations, in which the United States
military has participated twice, responding to North Korean
aggression in 1950 and Iraqi aggression in 1990.
A military action may be conducted unilaterally, under
the umbrella of the United Nations, or within a regional
security organization. By considering factors such as elite
and popular consensus internationally and domestically, this
study provides a decision-making model to help determine
which operational structure is most prudent.
Often regional crises fall into "gray" areas which may
necessitate some form of partial action by the U.S. In
these situations, U.S. Navy and intelligence community
assets are "low-risk, high-reward" ways to provide support
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for humanitarian aid and the "middle" levels of United
Nations military operations (separation of forces, law and
order, and use of limited force) without significantly
intruding on the host nation's sovereignty.
In summary, this thesis concludes the following:
- The U.S., as the world's supreme military power, is
best suited for United Nations military operations at
either extreme of the collective spectrum.
- A group of the world's secondary military powers have,
over the nearly fifty years of the United Nations,
created a peacekeeping culture, tradition, and
reputation. These countries remain best suited for
participation in the "middle" forms of collective
operations: humanitarian aid under difficult
conditions, separation of forces, law and order, and the
use of limited force.
- Often, non-military pressures require that some U.S.
effort be taken in response to regional crises. Elite
and popular consensus internationally and domestically
for a military action will result in the U.S. military's
doing something: most likely, a partial participation.
- The U.S. Navy is a "low-risk, high-reward" means of
providing support to the entire spectrum of United
Nations military operations, including those levels in
the "middle." Naval vessels are flexible, have a high
degree of "unilateralness, " and may provide temporary
control or a long-term presence in an area to project
power ashore or simply to aid resupply of ground forces.
- Another form of partial participation may be filled by
the U.S. intelligence community. Monitoring events and
information-sharing at either extreme of the collective
spectrum seem particularly straightforward.
- For the "middle" collective operations, the mandate
for U.S. intelligence is less clear. However, after
considering the importance of the U.S. interests at
stake and the discretion of the head of the United
Nations agency or mission involved, U.S. intelligence
support is another "low-risk, high-reward" activity.
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I . INTRODUCTION
In the Gulf we caught a glimmer of a better future--a
new world community brought together by a growing
consensus that force cannot be used to settle disputes
and that when that consensus is broken, the world will
respond. In the Gulf, we saw the United Nations playing
the role dreamed by its founders, with the world's
leading nations orchestrating and sanctioning collective
action against aggression.
President Bush, 1991
More than any other lesson learned during the Gulf War,
perhaps the most surprising is that the United Nations
Security Council is "beginning to act as it was designed,
freed from the superpower antagonisms that often frustrated
consensus, less hobbled by the ritualistic anti-Americanism
that so often weakened its credibility." [Ref. 1; 50] As
East-West tensions fade and the Security Council starts to
carry out its mandate to preserve peace, concurrently the
United States military prepares to accept considerable
reductions in its budget. Although the military budget will
drop by at least twenty-five percent over the next few years
[Ref. 2; A13] , the United States 's political and economic
interests continue to stretch around the globe. It seems
prudent, then, to reexamine the initial goals and objectives
of the Charter of the United Nations and explore those
conditions under which the United States military should
contribute to operations under the auspices of the United
Nations
.
While Jeanne Kirkpatrick reasonably asserts "it is
probably not yet safe for democracies to vest the definition
of the most fundamental rights of citizens in the votes of
an international body, most of whose members still do not
enjoy such rights," [Ref. 3; A9] the new, more pragmatic
atmosphere of the United Nations Security Council suggests
the potential for even more collective participation in
global crises in the future. The Gulf War may be an ill-
fitting prototype, with its obvious aggressor whose actions
had potentially enormous global economic repercussions that
translated easily into clearcut objectives for the United
Nations. But
(t)he Gulf Crisis did, however, demonstrate both the
possibility of the international use of force and the
limitations of such a use of force. It also provided
a useful measure of the strength and weakness of the
United Nations, and especially of the Security Council
[Ref. 4; 19]
At the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize ceremony, Sir Brian
Urquhart, then United Nations Under-Secretary-General in
charge of peacekeeping, said the following:
The rigors of the Cold War no longer paralyze the United
Nations. It even seems possible humanity could take the
great step forward towards a community of nations.
[Ref. 5; D2
]
Although a global "community of nations" is at best a long-
distant goal, even before the Gulf War the end of the Cold
War contributed to a considerable revitalization of the
United Nations Security Council. After the 1978 deployment
of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
,
more than ten years elapsed before another United Nations
peacekeeping operation commenced. In 1988 and 1989 alone,
the United Nations Security Council began five new
peacekeeping operations, raising the number of "blue-
helmeted" peacekeeping soldiers by one-third, to about
14,000. [Ref. 6; E2 ] Forces were dispatched to Afghanistan,
the Iran-Iraq border, Angola, Namibia and Central America.
"This doubled, in two years, the number of operations in the
field, a striking increase when it is remembered that only
thirteen such operations had been established during the
previous 40 years." [Ref. 7; xv] Recent initiatives
relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Cambodia suggest
the future will include even more intense and varied
operations
.
Additionally, the more cooperative atmosphere within the
Security Council is rubbing off on the General Assembly,
encouraging the Third World majority there "to drop its
anti-Western polemics in favor of consensus." [Ref. 8; E3
]
However, as will be discussed further in Chapter III of this
study, this consensus has limitations. In the late 1970s,
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when Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote a book describing his
tenure as the United States representative, he described the
United Nations as "a dangerous place." [Ref. 9] Ten years
later, then U.S. permanent representative to the United
Nations Thomas Pickering more charitably called it "a useful
place." [Ref. 10; A6] But the potential exists that East-
West tensions could be replaced by a North-South split
between industrialized and developing nations. As a
reporter for The New York Times recently wrote,
(p)oorer nations struggling to bring their economic
difficulties to center stage at the United Nations are
blocked by the United States, which believes that
development springs from domestic policies, not
international action. [Ref. 10; A6]
While perhaps overstated, his point remains clear: for the
first time in the Council's history the five permanent
members have started to work regularly together for the
solution of major problems, achieving impressive results;
but this new hegemony understandably "arouses the suspicions
of Third World countries, who fear that the organization
will become an instrument for imposing the views of the
northern industrialized nations on the developing south."
[Ref. 8; E3
]
A. THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
The Third World's concern about an expanded role for the
Security Council has both a psychological and a legal basis.
The Third World, sensitive to perceived "colonialism" by
the industrialized nations, holds most of the 178 General
Assembly seats, yet has none of the five permanent Security
Council positions. Similarly, the Third World may remain
hostile toward intervention because it implies
the existence of a hierarchy of states in fundamental
conflict with the principle that all independent states
are legally sovereign and equal. Ex-colonial states, in
particular, resent an institution that appears to confer
special rights on major Powers in the interests of
international order. To many non-aligned states
intervention smacks of neo-colonialism and imperialism.
[Ref. 11; 120]
Additionally, countries such as India and Brazil
legitimately may be considered regional superpowers, yet are
only occasionally one of the ten non-permanent members of
the Security Council. 1 Similarly, Germany and Japan are
clearly global economic superpowers but are virtually
relegated to a Third World status regarding international
1 Brazil was a non-permanent member of the Security
Council during 1946-7, 1951-2, 1954-5, 1963-4, 1967-8, and
1988-9; India was (is) a non-permanent member during 1950-1,
1967-8, 1972-3, 1977-8, 1984-5 and 1991-2.
security issues. 2 In June 1992, Japan amended its
constitution to allow for a military role in future global
crises. Previously, Japan "informally proposed the creation
of six new permanent Council seats that would not have a
veto." [Ref. 12; E3 ] However, the permanent members of the
Security Council probably regard any change to its structure
as unwise, especially considering that the Council is
"finally operating in an effective manner . . . therefore
now is the worst time to be tampering with it." [Ref. 13;
A6] Legally, the Charter clearly states the limitations on
the powers of the United Nations.
1. Purposes and Principles of the United Nations
In Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations,
the tension between international intervention and national
sovereignty becomes readily apparent. For example, Article
1 lists the following purposes for the United Nations:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to
that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations.
3
.
To achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural,
or humanitarian character.
2 Japan was (is) a non-permanent member of the Security
Council during 1958-9, 1966-7, 1971-2, 1981-2, 1987-8 and
1992-3. West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) was a
member of the council during 1977-8 and 1987-8, and East
Germany (German Democratic Republic) was a member from 1980-1.
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of these common ends.
Significantly, Article 2, which lists seven principles for
the achievement of the above purposes, specifically states,
"Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
2 . Peacekeeping
The maintenance of international peace and security
is the primary goal of the United Nations. [Ref . 14; 286]
The Preamble, the Purposes, and the Principles state this
aim. In attempting to achieve that goal, one of the most
visible United Nations activities has been the establishment
of peacekeeping forces in trouble spots throughout the
world. [Ref. 14; 2 86] And yet, the subject of peacekeeping
forces is not specifically addressed in the United Nations
Charter. Rather,
. . . peacekeeping evolved as a technique for
controlling dangerous regional conflicts at a time when
relations between the most powerful nations were not
such as to permit the Security Council to function fully
in the manner envisaged in the Charter. Now . . . the
world has witnessed a dramatic improvement in the
ability of the Council's members--both permanent and
non-permanent--to work together to help control and
resolve regional conflicts. [Ref. 7; xv]
If peacekeeping was a necessity borne from the need to
create new security measures during the Cold War, then the
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future may hold even more new paradigms for international
security. When searching for insights into future activity,
it is often beneficial to search for clues in the past. As
such, it is useful to discuss briefly the portions of the
Charter of the United Nations that delineate the means by
which the Security Council may attempt to "maintain
international peace and security."
3. Intervention
If the definition of intervention is "an act,
limited in time and scope, that is directed at changing or
preserving the political structure of the target state and
which lies outside the ambit of normal relations among
states," [Ref. 11; 101] then intervention can include not
only military, but also non-military aspects. The two
chapters dealing with United Nations 's non-military and
military peacemaking are Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of
Disputes
,
which includes Articles thirty-three through
thirty-eight, and Chapter VII, Action With Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression, which covers articles thirty-nine through fifty-
one. 3 Tellingly, the Charter articles concerning
international security are written to signify a gradual
Dag Hammarskjold (Sweden) , the United Nations
Secretary-General from 1953-61, joked that peacekeeping
operations might be put in a new Chapter "Six and a Half."
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escalation of United Nations intervention. In other words,
an article calling for a potentially more drastic level of
United Nations action is applicable only in the event that a
previous, more moderate level is unsuccessful. For example,
Chapter VI, Article 33 (1) entreats disputing nations to
"seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice." Subsequently, Article 33 (2) states,
"The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call
upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means," a
more aggressive role for the international organization. If
this is unsuccessful, then the "Security Council may
investigate any dispute, or any situation" (Article 34) it
deems may lead to international friction: an even more
aggressive role. Ultimately, if an international dispute
may not be settled by peaceful means, then "action" may be
taken by the Security Council under the banner of Chapter
VII.
B. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
The importance of clarifying potential levels of action
will become apparent as this study describes and determines
the circumstances under which the United States should
accede to or initiate a military role for the United
Nations. The study will begin with a discussion of six
types of U.N. military operations, ranging in intensity from
humanitarian aid to enforcement of United Nations Security
Council resolutions and punishment. The "secondary" or
middle categories of United Nations military roles have
traditionally been filled by the world's secondary or
middle-sized industrial powers. These middle categories of
United Nations military operations appear to be expanding.
However, while times are changing, and the Cold War
constraints that have kept the superpowers (and the other
permanent members of the Security Council) from
participating as peacekeepers have disappeared, other
remaining factors suggest the middle-sized powers are still
best suited for these operations. Ultimately, Chapter II
concludes that the United States, as a superpower and
permanent member of the Security Council, is best suited for
participation in the extreme forms of United Nations
military operations: those that are least and most violent.
The second portion of the study will describe a paradigm
for deciding whether specific circumstances exist for the
use of U.S. military force under the auspices of the United
Nations. This paradigm will include an examination of the
domestic and international conditions necessary for the
United States to participate in collective security
operations. These conditions include domestic and
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international elite consensus and popular support. A brief
description of these factors will be included. The Gulf War
and the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina will serve as
illustrative models.
In the history of the United Nations, the conditions for
large-scale United States military action under the auspices
of the United Nations have occurred only twice. For the
United States, the January 1992 version of National Military
Strategy of the United States states that the fundamental
objective of the country's armed forces has remained
constant: "to deter agression and, should deterrence fail,
to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential
foe." [Ref. 15; 6] Therefore, it seems that future United
Nations military operations will more often see a partial
United States participation than the massive role that
occurred in the Gulf War.
Partial participation in United Nations military
operations by the United States will be examined in Chapter
IV and V. Chapter IV will examine the United States Navy's
potentially unique roles in United Nations operations,
including the enforcement of economic sanctions, arms
control efforts, and logistics support to nearly all
potential United Nations military and non-military
operations. Chapter V will consider the role of the United
States intelligence community in United Nations operations.
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Finally, it is important to note several presumptions in
this study. First, the study presumes that no significant
additional amounts of money will be available to fund a
major United Nations standing military force or permanent
intelligence organization. The dynamic nature of
international politics is such that the vast majority of
United Nations operations probably will continue to be
relatively ad hoc. Additionally, the study surmises that
there will be no significant change to the Charter of the
United Nations or to its institutions at least until the
middle of the decade. This study also assumes the moribund
Military Staff Committee, a group of senior military
officers from the permanent members of the Security Council
originally envisaged by the drafters of the charter to act
as a unified advisory body for the "strategic direction of
any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security
Council," (Article 47(3)) will not be revitalized.
In studies of peacekeeping, the experts often divide the
actions into two categories: peacekeeping operations and
observer missions. This study will not address observer
missions, which often "can do no more than act as the eyes
and ears of the Security Council, investigating incidents,
acting as fact finders," [Ref. 16; 120-1] since there
appears little to be gained from such an effort. The
discussion of peacekeeping forces generally will be confined
12
to the role which the United States and the other Big Five
powers may take in the operations.
As the aforementioned limitations of the United Nations
reveal, for the foreseeable future there will continue to be
a tension between the sovereignty of nations and the
interests of the global community. Far from perfect, the
existing Security Council may turn out to be, like Winston
Churchill's famous definition of democracy, "the worst
possible mechanism for attempting to safeguard peace, except
for all the others." [Ref. 12; 3]
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II. TYPOLOGY OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS
During the Gulf crisis harsh reality was accompanied by
a good deal of rhetoric. There was talk of turning
points and defining moments, but the phrase likely to
resound the longest was the new world order.
[Ref. 4; 18]
The new world order is not very new and certainly not
very orderly.
Anonymous
Under the Charter of the United Nations, the United
Nations Security Council has primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. However,
historically the United Nations has not provided a system
for peace and security so much as a last resort, or safety
net for warring, deadlocked belligerents. The introduction
of this study presumed future United Nations military
operations will remain ad hoc. The basic issue becomes
when, in the new international climate, should the United
States military accede to or initiate support for a military
operation under the auspices of the United Nations.
Is an ad hoc security institution based on "vigilance,
consensus, common interest, collective action and
international law" [Ref. 4; 19] workable in the post-Cold
War era? The Cold War derailed the original purposes of the
United Nations, as "Soviet leaders treated the United
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Nations with suspicion, seeing it as at best a platform for
anti-Western propaganda, at worst an obstacle to world
revolution." [Ref. 8; E3 ] Now, examining the rapidity and
unity of the response to the recent Gulf War, in which the
members of the United Nations Security Council were able to
pass twelve resolutions between 2 August 1990 and 29
November 1990, suggests the United Nations as it currently
exists can play a stronger, more proactive role in future
global crises. By 11 October 1991, the Security Council
passed twenty-three resolutions directly relating to the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait, further suggesting that
the United Nations is developing the wherewithal to solve
problems, rather than simply comment on them.
From the United States 's point of view, a viable
Security Council becomes a useful means by which to protect
national interests. At the same time, General Powell
recently wrote "we must also retain the capability to
operate independently, as our interests dictate." [Ref. 15;
9] Of course, many national interests coincide with global
interests. As problems and conflicts around the world are
increasingly perceived to have global implications, it seems
logical that the world will turn to international
organizations, particularly the United Nations, to find
solutions. However, these coincidental interests
traditionally are secondary to the country's vital
15
interests, which have not significantly changed. 4
Therefore, even in an era of declining military budgets,
the United States and other nations will continue to view
the United Nations largely as an additional means for
pursuing vital interests or a convenient means for pursuing
peripheral interests. For increasingly important global
concerns such as protecting the environment and human
rights, eventually military forces under the auspices of the
United Nations will more actively battle violators of
international standards; however, continued constraints on
the Security Council and the General Assembly suggest for
the foreseeable future these issues will be acted upon by
other than military means. As mentioned earlier, for the
United States the question becomes under what circumstances
should the country accede to or initiate military operations
under United Nations auspices.
Just as the "different levels of conflict and their
individual characteristics, ranging from full-scale war to
domestic and intercommunal disputes, need to be recognized
by those concerned with conflict abatement and resolution,
"
[Ref. 16; 8] so too must the implications of different
levels of military action be examined to decide best how to
Donald Nuechterlein' s "National Interest Matrix,"
separating the intensity of national interests into four
categories: survival, vital, major, and peripheral, will be
discussed further in Chapter IV.
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enforce United Nations resolutions. This chapter lists six
levels of U.N. military operations, ranging in intensity
from humanitarian aid to enforcement of United Nations
Security Council resolutions and punishment. Traditionally,
the United States military has only participated in
collective military operations at either end of the
spectrum. Secondary military powers, the so-called
peacekeepers, have participated in the middle operations.
While the end of the Cold War suggests a broadening of the
middle types of operations, in general the extreme forms of
military operations—humanitarian aid, enforcement and
punishment --by their very nature will not likely change.
Rather, the occurrences of these operations may potentially
increase
.
In their excellent text on United Nations peacekeeping,
Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra use five categories to
describe the range of United Nations military operations.
The categories include "both traditional and potential
operations, and progress from simpler observation tasks to
more complex objectives of law and order, as well as various
uses of force." [Ref. 17; 8] Based on the operational
objectives to be met, their categories are as follows:
1. Observation









In general, one may characterize these categories by-
noting that observation missions require virtually no force,
level 2 separation of forces and level 3 law and order need
minimal force, level 4 use of limited force provides for
just that, and level 5 enforcement, at least in the Gulf
War, allows for "all means necessary." Weiss and Chopra
point out observation "covers the most diverse and least
controversial range on the escalating spectrum of
peacekeeping activities." [Ref. 17; 8] Therefore, as stated
in the introduction, observation missions will not be
directly addressed. 5 Instead, an additional category of
operation discussed will be level 1 humanitarian aid.
Likewise, with a Security Council seemingly more willing to
initiate actions in response to a wider variety of
conflicts, it seems useful to add a category beyond
enforcement: level 6 punishment for violations of
agreements/resolutions . The following, then, is a breakdown
of potential operations in which military forces either
under the command or the explicit consent of the United
Nations Security Council may participate.
However, Chapter V will examine the role of
information sharing in the collective security environment,
some of which is applicable for observation missions.
18
A. A PARADIGM OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS
1 . Humanitarian Aid
There is an increasing demand for international
intervention in humanitarian emergencies and human rights
violations. Just over a year ago, then-Secretary-General
Perez de Cuellar stated, "We are clearly witnessing what is
probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward
the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of
morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."
[Ref. 18; 455] Likewise, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski recently
wrote that international politics "are being transformed
into a more organic process of global politics. That
process tends to blur the distinction between domestic and
foreign priorities." [Ref. 19; 6] Therefore, the most
influential resolution passed by the United Nations Security
Council during the Gulf War may be Resolution 688 (1991)
,
adopted on 5 April 1991, which "represented a significant
development in the debate about international intervention
in domestic disputes, in this case Iraq's repression of its
Kurdish minority." [Ref. 18; 451] The resolution stated the
following:
[The U.N. Security Council] (d) emands that Iraq, as a
contribution to removing the threat to international
peace and security in the region, immediately end this
repression and expresses the hope in the same context
that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the
19
human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are
respected;
[The U.N. Security Council] Insists that Iraq allow
immediate access by international humanitarian
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all
parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary-
facilities for their operations (. ) [Ref. 20; 2]
In their recent study of military humanitarianism, Thomas
Weiss and Kurt Campbell point out that "... previous
General Assembly resolutions (were) moral and political
declarations, or 'soft' law, but Resolution 688 was
'harder, ' an operational decision by the Security Council to
authorize humanitarian intervention." [Ref. 18; 455] While
a shift in attitudes may be occurring, as previously
mentioned this study presumes the Charter, will undergo no
significant change in the near future that would reduce the
implications of intervening "in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
Therefore, precedents hold guidelines for future
contingencies
.
In general, humanitarian assistance may be divided
into two categories: unilateral relief (Panama or Sri
Lanka) or genuinely international relief (Sudan or
Ethiopia). [Ref. 18; 451] More important to this study are
the following three subcategories:
1. where a host nation extends an invitation for
assistance (Bangladesh)
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2. where assistance is given against the wishes of host
(Iraq)
3. where civil authority has evaporated (Liberia or
Yugoslavia)
Subcategory one, in which a needy country calls for outside
assistance in response to a natural or man-made disaster, is
self-explanatory, and detailed examination within this study
is not necessary. Obviously, the political controversies
and moral dilemmas inherent in intervening in a nation's
domestic affairs are irrelevant if the host nation invites
such intervention. Subcategories two and three, in which
the host country either does not have the desire or the
cohesion to request humanitarian assistance, are much more
complicated. Human rights violations by a government
against its people are something an outside organization
virtually cannot halt without intervening "in matters which




On one hand, the continuing effort to ease the
situation for the Kurds in northern Iraq could hail the
6 For the purposes of this study, the definition of a
human rights violation will follow Vernon Walters' 1989
statement at the United Nations, in which he explained the
basic position of the United States by saying, "Human rights
and fundamental freedoms limit the power and authority of the
state, in relation to the individual. When a state
transgresses those limits, it is the right and duty of the
world to call attention to such abuses." [ref. K; 177]
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beginning of a new, more aggressive interventionist attitude
regarding humanitarianism within the United Nations Security
Council. However, even among those who propose an enhanced
role for the United Nations, recent events in Yugoslavia
also reveal significant limitations in providing
international humanitarian aid. That Yugoslavia was not
brought to task by the Security Council, though fighting
between the Croats and the Serbs had been taking place for
months, is an indication of the sensitivity about areas of
jurisdiction. [Ref. 21; 39] Likewise, to win the support of
the non-aligned countries in the Security Council, "the
Western sponsors of the resolution (banning arms sales to
Yugoslavia) amended it to reflect the idea that the U.N. was
dealing with an international crisis and not interfering in
a domestic dispute." [Ref. 21; 39] Recently, the Commander-
in-Chief of the United States European Forces (CINCEUCOM)
offered intelligence collection assets to the United Nations
Secretary-General for tracking the conflict in Yugoslavia.
However, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, worried about the
reaction to uninvited U-2 overflights of the area, declined
the intelligence support; he did not specifically address
the use of other intelligence assets such as satellites or
shipboard collection capabilities. [Ref. 22]
The U.S. Navy and other western forces have
maintained a presence in the Adriatic to enforce economic
22
sanctions against Yugoslavia (arguably causing increased
hardships for the populace) , which may be at cross purposes
with the United Nations 's avowed goal of providing
humanitarian assistance to civilians caught in the
crossfire. However, it is plain that nothing short of a
prohibitively large force could impose peace in Yugoslavia
unless there is a change of heart among the belligerents.
Level 5 enforcement and level 6 punishment for violations of
agreements /'resolutions , which are described later, seem to
require a massive operation to succeed. In the past the
Security Council has judged the stakes to be so high only
twice: in Korea in 1950 and the Gulf in 1990.
However, such a force also may be needed in
Cambodia, with lesser United Nations forces required in
several other areas too, so the chances of mustering a
successful peacemaking army for Yugoslavia are slight.
Since the collapse of Yugoslavian unity, and the first
arrival of United Nations Peacekeeping forces in March 1992,
"umpteen ceasefires have been made and broken, most of them
faster than New Year's resolutions." [Ref. 23; 12] Debates
in recent months have centered on the possibility of U.S.
military aircraft escorting cargo aircraft carrying
humanitarian relief into the warring country, or possibly
landing troops in order to aid the civilian population.
However, as President Bush pointed out during an 8 August
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1992 press conference, "There isn't an easy formula; if
there was, we would have put it into effect before now."
Perhaps unsaid, but implied, is that a willingness of a host
nation or at least the major non-governmental organizations
within a host nation to accept U.S. military assistance
appears to be a mandatory prerequisite for using "all means
necessary" --including deploying U.S. ground forces--to
deliver humanitarian aid.
Therefore, the situation in Iraq, in which United
States military forces under the sponsorship of the United
Nations provide aid to the Kurds with the acquiescence of
the Iraqi government, seems an aberration resulting from the
devastation of the Iraqi military during the Gulf War. Only
when humanitarian operations fall into subcategory one,
where a host nation extends an invitation for assistance,
does it seem prudent for the U.S. to participate.
2. Separation of Forces
Weiss and Chopra define separation of forces as "the
traditional interposition force that referees a no-man's-
land between two states engaged in territorial conflict."
[Ref. 17; 19] This mission is conducted by peacekeeping
forces, but is farther along the spectrum of military
operations than strictly providing humanitarian assistance
or military observers. The traditional peacekeeping role
tends to occur at the end of a conflict; a theoretical
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future role, which would be to prevent a conflict from
erupting, will be addressed in the next section.
Although notoriously difficult to define, the role
of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been "the
prevention, containment, moderation and termination of
hostilities between or within states, through the medium of
a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed
internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers,
police and civilians to restore and maintain peace." 7 [Ref.
16; 11] Of the more than seventeen peacekeeping or
observation operations listed in Figure 2.1 that have taken
place since the United Nations 's efforts began in 1948 with
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
,
over thirty countries from Austria to Yugoslavia have
provided military units. [Ref. 7] While U.S. observers have
occasionally participated, only during the Korean Conflict
and the recent Gulf War (neither of which is considered a
traditional peacekeeping operation) have U.S. troops
participated. Other permanent members of the United Nations
This definition, used by the International Peace
Academy in its study of international control of violence:
"Report from Vienna: An Appraisal of the International Peace
Academy Committee's 1970 Pilot Papers," is quoted from The
Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future by
Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge (New Haven
CT: Yale University Press, 1974)
.
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Nations Participating in Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF I 1956-67 This first peacekeeping operation, in
response to the collapse of the armistice agreement between
Egypt and Israel, included the following ten nations:
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India,
Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia.
ONUC 1960-64 This large operation, which at its height was
comprised of nearly 20,000 officers and men in the Congo,
included forces from the following nations: Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Tunisia and Sweden.
UNTEA/UNSF 1962-63 The forces sent to maintain law and
order after the ceasefire between the Dutch and the Indo-
nesians in West New Guinea were Brazil, Ceylon (Sri Lanka),
India, Ireland, Nigeria, Sweden, Pakistan and Canada.
UNFICYP 1964- To quell the intercommunal strife between
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Canadian, British, Swedish,
Irish, Finnish, Danish, Austrian and Kiwi forces were sent.
UNEF II 1973-79 The 7,000 strong peacekeeping force,
deployed after the Yom Kippur War, had troops from twelve
countries: Canada, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden,
Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland and Senegal.
UNIFIL 1978- The chaotic situation in southern Lebanon led
to the establishment of this 6,000 member force that
included Iran, Canada, Sweden, France, Nepal, Norway,
Nigeria, Senegal, Fiji and Ireland.
Yugoslavia 1992- Current plans include the deployment of 12
infantry battalions (about a 14, 400-member force) in three
areas of Croatia. Contributing countries include Russia,
France, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Holland, Ireland and
Jordan. [Ref. 24; A13]
Additionally, U.N. observer missions have been sent to
the Palestinian/Lebanese area (UNTSO 1948- , UNOGIL 1958 and
UNDOF 1974- ) , Indian/Pakistani border (UNMOGIP 1949- and
UNIPOM 1965-66), Yemen (UNYOM 1963-64), the Dominican
Republic (DOMREP 1965-66), Afghanistan (1988-90), the
Iran/Iraq border (1988- ) , Angola (1989- ) , Namibia (1989-
90), and Central America (1989- ). Several of these





Security Council have only rarely participated. Britain and
France have committed forces largely because they already
were involved in independent efforts in an area; Russia's
first peacekeeping effort is Yugoslavia.
At first glance it seems surprising that countries
with the military assets and wide-ranging interests most
able to provide the aforementioned "prevention, containment,
moderation and termination of hostilities" have been least
likely to participate in an impartial collective security
action. This fact is highlighted in A. LeRoy Bennett's
International Organizations , which discusses the group of
countries, including "the Nordic states, Canada, and India,
(who) have been enthusiastic supporters of the peacekeeping
philosophy, have furnished men and material for peacekeeping
missions, and have provided leadership in short- and long-
range planning for more effective United Nations
peacekeeping activities." [Ref. 25; 144] Bennett stresses
that these countries are "in a unique position to contribute
personnel because of their reputation for neutrality." [Ref.
25; 144] Likewise, these countries have sufficient economic
and military resources, as well as a close affinity between
their national interests and the United Nations 's goals and
principles. Conspicuously absent from his "top ten" list
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are any of the permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council. 8
Ironically, it seems as though the United States,
the country with the most resources to offer international
peacekeeping, has historically provided the least. For
example, when the United Nations Peacekeeping forces won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, the "blue helmets" were
recognized publicly for their success, if not in closing
social or political fissures, then at least separating
forces in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia and Central America.
While the United Nations was breaking exciting new ground in
collective security, the United States Congress and
President were debating whether even to pay previously
agreed upon levels of financial support to the United
Nations. A U.S. view of the United Nations and its agencies
as "inefficient, bloated bureaucracies often hostile to
American interests" [Ref. 8; E3] led to the withholding of
$675 million due the organization during the 1980s and early
1990s.
This situation is especially perplexing, considering
the cost of the alternative to peacekeeping. For example,
Bennett's ten most frequent participants in
peacekeeping missions are Canada (16 times including Bosnia)
,
Finland (14), Sweden (13), Ireland (13), Denmark (11), Norway
(10), Italy (9), Australia (8), Austria (8), and India (8).
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although peacekeeping is expensive, 9 to put it in
perspective, "the annual cost of the observer group which
monitors the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq is less than
the value of the crude oil carried in only two
supertankers." [Ref. 7; xvii] Another writer pointed out
that "one and a half days of the cost of Desert Storm, the
operation which finally liberated Kuwait, would have paid
for all the U.N. peacekeeping operations world-wide for one
year." [Ref. 26; 317] Stability can be either good or bad
depending on the merits of the system in question, including
a variety of effects such as "unbridled arms races; the rise
of regional hegemons or other large imbalances of regional
or subregional balance of power; wholesale human rights
violations; flagrant breach of international law; subversion
of democratic and free-market institutions; and threats to
the sea-air-land-space lines of communication." [Ref. 27;
14] But it seems clear that keeping the peace is valuable
for a variety of reasons.
Weiss and Chopra state that there are at least five
traditional problems for peacekeeping forces. Importantly,
the last four of these five problems transcend "mere"
peacekeeping operations, and may be applied to any
9 In 1989 the peacekeeping budget was almost as great as
the United Nations 's regular budget.
29
multinational operation. 10 The first, consent of the
parties, applies to those least violent operations in which
little military force by the intervening agency is expected
to be required. In the context of this study, consent of
the parties is required for humanitarian operations and
separation of forces.
Peacekeeping necessitates a defensive nature, so an
international force traditionally has not had the
tools to impose its will on a nation's regular army, an
armed insurgent group, or rampant faction. Without
'political will' --that is, the desire and intention of
parties to cease fighting and to end their conflict--
peacekeepers are ineffective. [Ref. 17; 31]
Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar pointed out in 1990, a
peacekeeping operation is an "interim arrangement; it
should, ultimately, contribute to a just and lasting
solution to the conflict concerned." [Ref. 7; xvii] This
"just and lasting solution," however, is only possible when
disputing factions are ready to accept a solution short of
complete victory.
The second requirement is garnering political
support from the Security Council and member states.
Political consensus, discussed further in Chapter III, is
Weiss and Chopra's fifth peacekeeping concern is
funding and logistical support from the Security Council and
member states, which will not be discussed in this study.
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often difficult to achieve, and may directly affect the
creation of a peacekeeping force's operational mandate.
Potentially more tricky is maintaining political support
during difficult or controversial operations.
The third difficulty is creating the operational
mandate. Weiss and Chopra point out that the creation of
these often require compromises, so ambiguity in the mandate
has often been necessary to achieve consensus. An
enlightening case to consider is the use of the U.S.
military and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) in 1982-1984. The 6,000 soldiers from Finland,
Fiji, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Senegal and Sweden "existed to prevent the constant
Israeli/PLO strife" [Ref. 28; 194] along the
Israeli/Lebanese border. However, the largely ineffectual
effort nearly resulted in Yassir Arafat's and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) extinction,
which led to the U.S.'s being asked to help arrange a PLO
withdrawal from the region during the summer of 1982: a
clear mission for the U.S., and one which it successfully
conducted. But, afterwards, as time went on and U.S. forces
were reinserted into Lebanon in September 1982, their
mission "was not as clear or finite." [Ref. 28; 196]
Perhaps the lesson most well learned from the U.S.'s
participation in the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon,
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which resulted in the tragic deaths of more than 218
marines, 18 sailors and three soldiers [Ref. 28; 228] at the
hands of an Islamic Hezballah Amal terrorist in October
1983, is that an unclear mandate is not only a factor for
the multinational forces, it also directly affects the
perceptions of host countries.
A fourth difficulty the use of force. Perhaps the
greatest change between traditional United Nations military
operations and those of the future will be regarding the use
of force by peacekeepers. Weiss and Chopra state that "even
if peacekeepers use force of some kind, it does not follow
that they have no limitations on their authorization to
employ it." [Ref. 17; 42] It seems logical that a more
intrusive mandate will require less constrained forces.
Mackinlay, in his "Powerful Peacekeepers," proposes that
combat soldiers from larger and better equipped militaries
such as those of the permanent members of the Security
Council contribute to the more intrusive operations. [Ref.
29; 248] An additional constraint on force is
proportionality of action. [Ref. 17; 41] Therefore, the
interpretation of "all necessary means" to allow large-scale
strategic bombing of Iraq during the Gulf War seems an
anomaly due to the nature of Iraq's aggression and the




In the post-Vietnam United States, as its military-
force's options become more severely constrained, a
deployment probably will be less apt to achieve and maintain
the domestic consensus required for the military to
participate successfully. As Colin Powell recently wrote,
"one of the essential elements of our national military
strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces
needed to win--the concept of applying decisive force to
overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts
swiftly with a minimum loss of life." [Ref. 15; 10]
Therefore, if the United States participates but is not at
the vanguard of a collective security operation, it seems
imperative that a clear mandate allowing sufficient force is
required; if the United States is in control of the
operation, a more ambiguous mandate from the Security
Council may allow the military force sufficient leeway to
pursue aggressive military objectives. However, decision-
makers must take into account global perceptions of undue
military force which could quickly erode international
support for a collective security operation.
3 . Law and Order
The idea of preventing an outbreak of violence
rather than reacting to an outbreak seems closer to the
spirit of the Charter than the use of peacekeeping forces.
Weiss and Chopra point out that "very few operations have
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been authorized to maintain law and order, which could well
be considered the turning point between Chapters VI and VII
in the spectrum of international military operations." [Ref.
17; 20] Force is used in more than a strictly defensive
capacity (although only on exceptional occasions) , and the
forces mandated are allowed more intrusive powers than those
allotted peacekeepers. With less constraints on military-
power, the likelihood of United States participation
increases accordingly.
In his Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the
United Nations for Peacekeeping , Larry Fabian notes that the
differences between preparedness for collective security and
preparedness for peacekeeping are conspicuous:
Collective security armies, for instance, were to be
largely Big Five armies, a proviso not written
explicitly into the Charter, but imprinted there--in one
writer's metaphor--in invisible ink. These permanent
members of the Security Council were to be the mainstays
of U.N. striking forces because they were thought to
possess the political and military weight to enforce the
United Nations' collective will rather than because they
displayed political impartiality and lack of interest in
outcomes of local quarrels. But the latter are often
the crucial badges of a peacekeeper. [Ref. 30; 5-6]
Impartiality and lack of interest are the grounds on which
the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
traditionally have been excluded from participating in most
United Nations military operations. Global superpowers
necessarily have global interests, and the geopolitical
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circumstances in which the United States, as an island
nation not fully self-sufficient in resources, has found
itself means impartiality was often difficult or impossible
to achieve. While "it can be argued that only major powers
wield the real instruments of preventive diplomacy, such as
control of the flow of arms or of international trade,
"
[Ref. 4; 23] more accurately the very reasons that the
United States uses to justify its leading role in
international organizations such as the United Nations--
trade relations and commerce, security concerns, and
political interests--have virtually prohibited the
possibility of the United States' s maintaining impartiality
in regional crises. The United States, with its global
economy, logically has its "finger in the pie" of a good
many smaller nations, suggesting it may not be the most
impartial of peacekeepers or peacemakers, especially when
its legitimate interests are at stake. [Ref. 30; 24] In
other words, the U.S. has virtually never been an objective
observer of regional disputes. Is this situation changing?
The most correct answer is both yes and no.
The end of the Cold War has signalled a new era in
relations between the United States and what once was the
Soviet Union: an era in which objections to activity by
permanent members of the Security Council apparently will
less likely conflict with the interests of the other
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permanent Council members. This relative unanimity
logically may lead to additional Security Council activity.
However, this increased activity could conflict with the
interests of Third World nations. If the vital interests of
developing nations are most often considered in terms of
international prestige and national sovereignty, then
intrusive activity by the Security Council may directly
affect the vital interests of developing nations.
The composition of the United Nations has changed
over the years, and now developing nations hold a majority
of the General Assembly seats. Therefore, it appears that
smaller nations' perceptions of the permanent Security
Council members' partisan intervention in regional crises
may become even more sensitive, even if "the Cold War's
demise has diminished what little sense of political unity
remains among the members of the so-called nonaligned
movement, encouraging developing countries to go their own
ways." [Ref. 31; A13] As a result, it seems logical that
the developing world may become a jealous (and zealous)
watchdog as its influence at the United Nations diminishes
while real power passes to the United States, the Russian
Federation and the other permanent members of the revived
Security Council.
Weiss and Chopra point out that even if the
sensitivities of Third World nations to intervention could
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be assuaged, "the practical problem remains regarding the
extent, size, and capacities of a U.N. law-and-order
operation." [Ref. 17; 21] Past precedents such as the
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960 suggest
large-scale law-and-order operations are virtually
impossible to perform during a civil war. However, the need
to replace multinational forces in the camps created for the
Kurds in Iraq suggest something must be done. Similar
situations are bound to arise in the future. While credible
firepower is needed, still it seems the traditional reasons
for keeping United States military forces from participating
in peacekeeping operations (potentially undue limitations on
force, and Third World concerns of neo-colonialism and lack
impartiality) remain valid regarding future law-and-order
operations
.
4 . Use of Limited Force
Weiss and Chopra describe the use of limited force
as "the missing link" [Ref. 17; 22] between traditional
defensive peacekeeping roles and the aggressive actions of
enforcement operations. Logically, if United Nations
military operations become increasingly involved in civil
wars, "enhanced peacekeepers with 'teeth' will be required
to protect local populations and prevent widely accepted
peace processes from being unlawfully violated." [Ref. 17;
23] Past debacles such as the MNF in Beirut and the IPKF in
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Sri Lanka highlight the difficulties in sending forces with
limited capabilities into areas in which warring parties are
likely to have more knowledge of the area and a stronger
"political will.
"
It is a fundamental tenet of realism that security-
concerns will override other factors in determining a
country's policies. This point suggests that as
international security concerns become less political,
regional instabilities will likely require more intrusive
forms of intervention. "Soon it will no longer be
acceptable," wrote Bernard Kouchner in Le Monde, "to cross a
border to wage war but not to do the same to make peace and
save lives." 11 With the reduction in fears concerning
global escalation of regional disputes, there will be an
increasing demand for international intervention in local
emergencies of virtually every type. However, if
the international system is to play a helpful role in
the disorders of the future, its members will not simply
have to improve its performance and its capacity to
intervene constructively. Governments also will have to
consider how, and how far, to modify the existing rules
of the game, especially as regards national sovereignty
and the sacrosanct nature of domestic jurisdiction.
[Ref. 4; 20]
Quoted by Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell in
"Military Humanitarianism, " Survival , (September/October
1991) : 451-465.
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But, as mentioned earlier, this study presumes that there
will be no significant changes to the Charter of the United
Nations in the near future that will allow for easier
intrusion into a sovereign nation's domestic disputes.
Therefore, the controversies surrounding international
intervention in chronic disputes is likely to grow as the
potential intensity of that intervention grows too.
Regarding the United States military, significantly
limiting its power to perform a security operation seems
counter to any reason for sending it. Weiss and Chopra
describe limited force operations as a bridge between
peacekeeping and enforcement operations. While
theoretically possible, history suggests these operations
are impractical for the United Nations, especially if the
military command structure of the United Nations (or lack of
one) does not change.
5 . Enforcement
If peacekeeping forces have been best created from
middle or secondary powers, then enforcement of United
Nations resolutions that extend beyond mere peacekeeping
activities must be the realm of the Big Five. "At the
higher levels of the conflict spectrum big power interests
are more deeply involved, and any attempt at physical
interventions by middle and small nation-states to influence
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a peaceful settlement are neither realistic nor viable."
[Ref. 16; 8] Like a rubber band stretching to contain a
bundle of papers, as more United Nations countries become
involved in resolution enforcement, the likelihood of
consensus failure increases accordingly. 12 In the words of
Weiss and Chopra, "the feasibility of ideal forms of
collective security remains in question." [Ref. 17; 24]
Enforcement of Security Council resolutions may take
many forms, including political, economic, or diplomatic
pressure. But, while "military intervention in internal
conflicts is only the tip of the iceberg," [Ref. 11; 117]
and the military as an instrument of policy is almost never
used in isolation, ultimately, military force remains the
final arbiter of international disputes.
Only three times has the United Nations called for
enforcement operations: most notably in Korea in 1950 and
the Gulf in 1990, but also in Rhodesia (1966-75)
.
Interestingly, in each of these operations, one of the
permanent members of the Security Council took the lead in
garnering Security Council support for resolutions allowing
for the use of force. In the first two instances the United
States and in the third, the United Kingdom, was at the
12 The importance of achieving a consensus before and




vanguard. (The British role played in Rhodesia, while
technically an enforcement/punishment role, was more
accurately a naval peacekeeping mission.) Interestingly, in
Rhodesia and the Gulf the vanguard nation virtually "sub-
contracted" the operation from the United Nations; only in
Korea was the enforcement operation conducted under a United
Nations flag.
The political cohesion required to secure consistent
political or economic pressure on belligerents is
exceedingly difficult, and appears only practical when one
nation takes the vanguard of the operations. The relative
ease with which the United Nations Security Council achieved
consensus during the Gulf War was a rarity, resulting from
U.S. efforts. The relatively limitless means allotted the
multinational force seems more of an anomalous than a
representative model of future crisis response. However,
enforcement operations—one of the extreme forms of
collective operation—will likely remain a relatively rare
or anomalous activity.
6. Punishment for Violations of Agreements /Resolutions
A primary lesson learned during the Gulf War was
that enforcement operations, given the proper mandate, are
able to succeed. In the aftermath of the war, it seems the
next logical step for collective security forces is the
implementation of punishment measures resulting from
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violations of Security Council agreements or resolutions
By punishment, this study means operations that stretch
beyond implementation of punitive economic or political
sanctions, operations that include what could be, in
essence, a retaliatory strike for failure to comply with
Security Council measures.
In one writer's words,
To read the Charter is to glimpse the kind of future the
drafters of that document were making provision for,
even though many were not optimistic about its
likelihood. Great powers, their wartime unity
sufficiently preserved, were to be the foundation of a
new collective security system. They jointly were to
guide it from the Security Council; they were to
guarantee it with armed forces, principally their own,
placed at the Council's disposal; they were to guard
their own interests from unwanted U.N. action by their
veto power, without which none of the Big Five would
have joined the U.N. Potential aggressors were to be
deterred or, if this failed, were to be punished by the
combined military might of the international community.
[Ref. 30; 1]
However, one of the presumptions of this study is that
neither the MSC nor standing military forces, two
organizations originally envisioned in the Charter, will be
revitalized. Therefore, the fundamental difficulty of
conducting a retaliatory operation in a collective security
context is that it requires a degree of cohesion not built
into the institutions of the United Nations themselves. The
difficulties of achieving consensus for a punishment
operation was highlighted in 1986, when the United States,
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conducting the retaliatory strikes against Libya, was not
granted overflight rights by its "ally" France. Likewise,
the vagarities of the "all necessary means" language during
the events leading up to the Gulf War suggest the clarity of
a potential military operation's mandate is inversely
proportional to the controversy surrounding it.
Taking the long view, someday Security Council
resolutions may include clearcut, automatic punishment
measures if compliance does not occur. "That is to say, a
seriously negative evaluation of a situation should trigger
off appropriate
. . . action within or outside the Security
Council." [Ref. 4; 23] However, United Nations military
operations traditionally have "taken different forms to meet
a number of different crises," [Ref. 17; 4] because of the
ad hoc nature of the operations and the lack of cohesion at
the Security Council. During the Gulf War and, earlier, the
Korean Conflict, this lack of cohesion was mitigated by two
coincidental occurrences: the leadership role accepted by
the United States and the virtual non-existence of activity
from the Soviet Union. Currently, an increased coordination
and notification between United States and former Soviet
military forces bodes well for a cooperative environment in
future military operations. But, ultimately, without a
coherent command structure, United Nations military
operations may only be possible with a United States willing
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to take the burden of responsibility for the effort. This
may occur in instances in which the repercussions of a
nation's failure to comply with United Nations 's measures
are clearly spelled out in a Security Council resolution.
On the other hand, as Security Council guidelines for a
military operation become more clearly defined, it seems
inevitable that military power will become more limited. As
will be shown in the next chapter, when consensus exists in
the United States for a military operation using "all
necessary means," but does not exist internationally, a
unilateral operation is the better option.
B. CONCLUSIONS
As discussed earlier, it is the middle or secondary
world powers who appear best able to participate in United
Nations peacekeeping operations, because it is they who are
most likely to invoke trust in the disputing parties. At
the "frontier of peacekeeping," [Ref. 17; 23] law and order
operations likely will be less constrained than the more
traditional separation of forces. However, law and order
remains closely related to traditional peacekeeping
operations, and those countries with the military culture
and global reputation for peacekeeping remain most suited
for the role. Regarding the use of limited force, the
permanent members of the Security Council have the resources
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to participate. However, the United States would likely-
have significant problems achieving the domestic consensus
required to participate—especially if the operation did not
relate to the country's vital interests.
For military actions outside the parameters of
peacekeeping, actions such as enforcement and punishment , a
superpower seems required. The precedent of the Gulf War
suggests the United States may have earned the reputation of
an enforcer without a neo-colonialist agenda. In President
Bush's words, "America's role is rooted not only in power,
but also in trust." [Ref. 1; 8] Likewise, "America cannot
be responsible for solving all the world's security
problems. But she remains the country to whom others turn
when in distress." [Ref. 27; 16] Punishment operations,
while theoretically possible in a collective context, seem
more apt to occur as unilateral operations.
The difficulty, then, for United States decision-
makers is determining under what circumstances the nation's
military should get involved in large-scale United Nations
operations. With a sufficient mandate from the United
Nations to use its "superpower, " the United States is well
equipped to act in a collective role. Without, a unilateral
operation appears to be the best option. The next chapter




III. MODEL FOR U.S. DECISION-MAKING
Increasingly we may find ourselves in situations in
which our interests are congruent with those of nations
not tied to us by formal treaties. As in the Gulf, we
may be acting in hybrid coalitions that include not only
traditional allies but also nations with whom we do not
have a mature history of diplomatic and military
cooperation or, indeed, even a common political or moral
outlook. This will require flexibility in our diplomacy
and military policy, without losing sight of the
fundamental values which that diplomacy and policy are
designed to protect and on which they are based. To
this end, we are well served to strengthen the role of
international organizations like the United Nations.
President Bush, 1991
If "U.S. activism in concert with other industrial
democracies most completely takes into account the
relationship between ends and limited means, takes advantage
of allies' contributions, focuses on what the U.S. does
well, and plays to U.S. strengths," [Ref. 27; 9] then it is
extremely important to determine the factors involved in a
decision to conduct a collective security operation.
Typically, policy follows public opinion. But, whereas
previous studies have examined the important "task of
garnering and maintaining public support for intervention
policy," [Ref. 32; 1] and many others have detailed the
means for best conducting various types of warfare, this
portion of the study will describe the two-stage model
presented in Figure 3.1 (located toward the end of the
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chapter) , encompassing both the support and the means for
collective security decision-making.
The first stage examines three important domestic
factors that currently affect U.S. decision-making: goal
definition, domestic elite consensus, and domestic popular
support. These factors will be described and examined in
detail. Obviously, not all potential U.S. military
operations are appropriate for participation by collective
security organizations. The Panama and Grenada operations,
to name two, while garnering enough public support
domestically 13 for unilateral action by the U.S. military,
likely would never have received the global support required
for action by an international organization. If a domestic
consensus exists, military operations may occur. For
collective military operations, an international consensus
is needed.
The second stage of this collective security decision-
making model highlights two international factors that
affect U.S. decision-making: international elite support
and global popular support. If these factors, along with
the previously mentioned domestic factors, are achieved,
13 It has been compellingly argued that support for the
Grenada operation came after the fact, largely due to the
success of the operation. In any case, Grenada and Panama
eventually received solid domestic support; international
support was on much shakier ground.
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then it appears appropriate for the U.S. military to
participate in a collective security operation.
It is also important to consider the differences between
regional and international security organizations. One can
imagine a scenario in which a collective security
organization such as the Organization of American States or
NATO would be able to achieve the aforementioned decisive
factors, but an international organization such as the
United Nations could not. A situation wherein a regional
organization, but not an international organization, would
be willing to accept the risks involved in an operation that
has extremely significant local, but not global
implications, comes to mind. If this scenario occurs, then
a regional organization is probably the appropriate means
with which to conduct a military operation. The decision-
making model includes this possibility in its "partial"
international elite consensus and international popular
dissension. After all, for a government or military (or
even a public) besieged by simultaneous emergencies and
often limited by budget, manpower or other concerns, not
every regional crisis is equally important.
Similarly, it is important to consider several moral
issues when examining the use of collective security forces.
In a perfect world, in which the U.S. or other
industrialized democracies had unlimited assets, virtually
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every legitimate request for humanitarian assistance would
be met. However, while moral considerations may be
important or even decisive in garnering public support for
military operations, with little effort, one also may
imagine a scenario in which humanitarian assistance is
called for, and yet the U.S. government may not be able to
respond because military and civilian assets are already
dedicated to another, more pressing need. Returning to the
six levels of operations discussed in the first portion of
this chapter, this study presumes that as events escalate
the ladder of military action, each higher rung takes
precedence over the lower ones. For example, as events
during Desert Shield and Storm unfolded (level 5 enforcement
and level 6 punishment for violations of agreements/
resolutions)
, U.S. military forces were pulled from their
responsibilities in Europe (in a sense operating as Cold War
peacekeepers, which equates to level 2 separation of forces)
and elsewhere to fulfill the more pressing obligation in the
Middle East.
A. DOMESTIC FACTORS
Domestic factors must first be considered because
without the support of the U.S. populace and the National
Command Authority, clearly a military operation will not be
initiated. In order to streamline this study's decision-
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making model, it will be presumed that factors such as
funding, manpower and policy can be grouped within the
category of National Command Authority (NCA) consensus.
Whereas military staffs must continuously plan and consider
a wide range of contingencies, in the language of this study
the vast majority of these actions never occur because the
elite consensus required for the operation to take place has
not been reached. Only after a domestic debate has occurred
and a consensus achieved can the U.S. look to collective
security organizations for potential participation in an
operation. While the relationship between elite consensus
and popular consensus is a little like that between the
chicken and the egg, nevertheless there are several
important factors in deciding whether domestic consensus
before military action is possible.
1. Domestic Elite Consensus
If elite organizations or persons are defined as
those "who are able, by virtue of their strategic
position ... to affect national political outcomes
regularly and substantially," [Ref. 33; 8] then the elite
within the United States government is the NCA and Congress.
The Constitution gives the President the power to employ
military forces, while the congressional role is to provide
the forces and the laws under which they operate. The war
power is a shared power with Congress; the Constitution
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intends it to be shared. As with any shared power, power is
strongest when the NCA and Congress agree. However,
Congress often is not equipped to deal with a complex, risky
military debate in a short time. 14 Therefore, presidents
often act unilaterally to employ military forces.
While Congress has the power to declare war,
historically it has voted usually after war has started.
For example, there have been more than 2 00 occasions when
presidents have used military force, but only five
declarations of war. [Ref. 34; 357] However, even with
constitutional authority, the President's political
authority is vastly enhanced by congressional backing. To
consider consensus practically (if somewhat cynically) , if a
military operation has a successful result, a congressional
consensus is not especially necessary. Likewise, if a
military operation fails or its costs are extraordinarily
high, it also does not matter if Congress has approved the
operation in advance, because it will likely second-guess
the NCA anyway. In other words, while congressional
14 For example, in August 1941, just four months before
Pearl Harbor, the House of Representatives was able to muster
only a one-vote margin for continuing the Selective Service
system. Nearly fifty years later, on 12 January 1991, the
congressional resolution granting the "use of military force"
in Desert Storm passed in the House by a vote of 250 to 183,
and barely passed in the Senate by a vote of 52 to 47. [ref.
34; 3 62]
51
goodwill is a worthy goal, there is relatively little gain
and lots of risk in wooing Congress.
Ultimately, the question becomes, what role does
Congress play in the debate on the use of military forces?
For the purposes of this study, Congress's most important
role is in providing a forum for conducting the public
debate necessary to determining whether there is a domestic
popular consensus.
2. Domestic Popular Consensus
If "democracies are unique in their reliance upon
public support for sustained intervention," [Ref. 32; 19]
then public opinion is the groundswell upon which the NCA
may propel its defense policies. In his excellent Naval
Postgraduate School thesis entitled A Democratic Call to
Arms: Public Opinion and Intervention Policy, Carl Graham
notes three "sliding" factors that tend to mirror public
opinion: fear of escalation, global/regional reaction and
liberal values. Briefly, fear of escalation addresses the
"psychological effects of potential vertical, horizontal, or
temporal escalation"; [Ref. 32; 20] Global /regional
reaction considers that "the American public knows that
global and regional support (or at least apathy) are
desirable prerequisites to successful intervention"; [Ref.
32; 22] finally, liberal values are another name for "the
American value system itself." [Ref. 32; 25] In other
52
words, "American values dictate that the costs of
intervention must be justified by legitimate objec-
tives ... in the beliefs and vocabulary of the liberal
ethic." [Ref. 32; 28] While these factors do indeed play a
role in determining public support for a military operation,
since the end of the Cold War these factors have
significantly changed in importance.
Fear of escalation was, in a sense, what made the
Cold War so frigid. Now, with the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists' s setting back its Doomsday Clock15 and the 1992
Olympic Games ' s being the first in two decades not boycotted
by at least one nation, this study submits that fear of
escalation is virtually a non-factor in public opinion. In
contrast, global/regional reactions, or at least public
perceptions of international opinion, probably have
increased in importance. In an earlier section of this
study, the changing nature of the U.S. security threat was
mentioned, with environmental and health concerns pointing
to a future wherein the sovereignty of nations may take a
back seat to the advancement of liberal and humanitarian
values. Therefore, while humanitarian concerns have moved
15 The Bulletin's clock, "symbol of the threat of global
catastrophe," currently stands at 17 minutes to midnight, so
far back that it is in previously uncharted territory.
Conceived at the dawn of the Cold War, the clock was designed
with a fifteen-minute range.
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even further to the forefront of U.S. public opinion, fear
of escalation and global war concerns have been replaced by
a new factor that may best be described as clearcut goal
definition. If one accepts that the culture of the United
States inherently stresses goal achievement, seemingly more
so than many other cultures, then American values are such
that the public will bestow confidence in a military action
in which movement takes place and a goal is to be achieved.
During the Cold War, static operations regarding the Soviets
(level 2 separation of forces) were the price paid for
achieving a global balance of power. Now, there will more
likely be support for an operation that accomplishes a
clearcut goal rather than a mission that keeps someone else
from accomplishing a goal. General Schwarzkopf, in his
testimony during Senator Nunn's Fall 1990 Armed Services
Committee hearings on the military operation in the Gulf,
reportedly said the following: "If the alternative to dying
[during an offensive] is sitting out in the sun for another
summer, that's not a bad alternative." [Ref. 34; 342]
However, in the context of collective security, the
relatively status quo (or static) "mid-level" operations--
level 2, separation of forces; level 3, law and order; and
level 4, use of limited force- -which, as this study submits,
are relatively alien to the popular American perceptions of
a dynamic military, are best conducted by mid-level
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industrialized powers, such as those countries listed in




1. International Elite Support
In the language of this study, the international
elite consists of the heads of allied governments, most
notably members of NATO and other countries with close
political, economic or military ties to the U.S., such as
Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Additionally, the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are
part of the international elite. International elite
consensus occurs when there is an absence of vetoes by other
members of the Big Five and tacit or public endorsement for
an operation by U.S. "friends and allies." [Ref. 1; 112]
Clearly, members of the international community will
support intervention when it serves their interests. When
the issue at stake does not directly affect their vital or
major interests, members will most likely support (or at
least not denigrate) U.S. military intervention. In that
event, unilateral action appears the best alternative for
the U.S. military. When a potential U.S. military action
appears likely to arouse allies' or Security Council's
worries (which would, in fact, probably be every case), then
55
a clear articulation of the ideological and practical
justification of the operation should ease the fears of the
international elite. For the foreseeable future, this study-
does not consider possible that there will be a U.S.
military action that directly conflicts with the majority of
its allies' or members of the Security Council's best
interests
.
2. International Popular Support
Democratic rule is an intrinsic part of the U.S.
political tradition. Likewise, an intervention by the U.S.
military against a majority of world opinion is contrary to
this tradition. Of course, there have been and probably
will be future instances in which the U.S. will intervene
militarily contrary to world popular opinion: instances in
which short term security concerns outweigh the traditional
importance of popular opinion. As shown by the model in
Figure 3.1, however, in those cases U.S. interests are best
served by unilateral U.S. military action, rather than
action by a collective security organization. Likewise, an
action that arouses world public opinion against the U.S.
will likely not achieve the elite consensus required for a
collective security operation in the first place.
Determining whether international popular consensus
exists remains a crude activity. There are nearly as many
opinions and positions in the world as there are people.
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"Too often, we have to rely on impressions and assertions,
prejudices and preconceptions, newspaper cuttings and quick
visits." [Ref. 35; 36] Perhaps the best way to consider
whether global popular support exists for an operation is to
ask the opposite question: does global popular support not
exist? In other words, if there is a significant rise in
demonstrations, unrest, terrorist activity and strident
open-press rhetoric, then the hoped-for global popular
support does not exist. However, if there is no clear
demonstration of opposition to the operation, then the
decision-maker may presume that either support for or apathy
for an operation exists.
C. DECISION-MAKING MODEL
Figure 3.1 presents a model for deciding whether the
United States should look to collective security
organizations to intervene in a given scenario. The model
is divided into two phases to account for the domestic
factors that decide whether the U.S. military should
participate and the international factors that reveal
whether the U.S. may best act unilaterally or in cooperation
with other nations' military forces. The process is
iterative. Once the initial criteria are met, decision-
makers must continue to maintain domestic and international











































intervention must be reconsidered, with an eye to
terminating the operation or restructuring it from a
collective to an independent action.
The process is fairly straightforward. Beginning with
the first step of clearcut goal definition, decision-makers
are asked to analyze whether, after there is a domestic
elite consensus, there is also domestic popular support for
the operation. After achieving the necessary domestic
popular support, decision-makers need to consider whether
the enhanced media spotlight given to collective operations
will increase or decrease the chances of success for the
operation. If increased publicity seems likely to increase
the probability of success, then decision-makers may look to
the international elite for the consensus required to
initiate collective security operations. If an
international elite consensus, as well as global mass
support, exists then an operation under the auspices of the
United Nations is appropriate. If either international
elite support or global mass support does not exist, but
regional elite support and regional mass support do
(considered "partial" support in the model) for a given




D. IRAQ AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
As a means to illustrate the utility of this model, it
is interesting to compare the elite and popular perceptions
internationally and domestically of the situations in Iraq
in 1990-1 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991-2. Virtually
from the moment Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, there
was an international outcry. With a clearcut aggressor and
the precedent of the Carter Doctrine highlighting the vital
interests of the region, a clearcut goal definition of
defending the Saudi border was achieved by the domestic
elite; early support by the President for a wholesale
military effort not unduly limited in the use of force in
defense of Saudi Arabia helped keep the NCA from significant
disagreements. From the domestic popular viewpoint, Saddam
Hussein's military aggression clearly violated American
liberal values, and the stories of atrocities by his forces
in Kuwait helped fortify popular support. Likewise,
international elite support was confirmed officially through
emergency sessions of the Security Council and unofficially
through personal contacts between President Bush, senior
members of his staff and other heads of state, most notably
the Emir of Kuwait and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who
ultimately decided to accept U.S. ground forces. Examining
whether there was global mass dissension, in the form of
rampant protests or increasing terrorist activity, the
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answer is no, which results in the decision-making model
concluding that a United Nations military operation (Desert
Shield) is appropriate.
As the coalition deployment progressed, Saddam Hussein
continued his military build-up and economic looting of
Kuwait, helping to steel international support against him.
Additionally, he committed a series of blunders including
holding western hostages, threatening an escalation of the
conflict and rejecting calls for negotiations with the
United States during fall 1990. President Bush met with
congressional leadership on 30 November 1990 [Ref. 34; 337],
leading to Senator Nunn's hearings and a vote of confidence
from Congress on 12 January 1991 for an offensive operation.
In the language of this study's decision-making model, the
vote symbolized domestic popular support for Desert Storm
(at least, once virtually every diplomatic effort to end the
crisis had been attempted)
.
As a sidenote, this transformation to the offensive is
where events significantly altered from those in Korea
nearly 40 years earlier. Whereas General MacArthur's United
Nations force had difficulty receiving a mandate to cross
the 38th parallel, what one writer described as a "curious
hesitancy in many reactions" [Ref. 3 6; 585] to news of the
plan to unify Korea, General Schwarzkopf was in a position
to use "all necessary means" including specifically the "use
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of military force." The difference in the two operations is
largely due to the aforementioned fear of escalation. While
the Chinese army's entering Korea completely changed the
dynamic of that conflict, during the Gulf War Israel
remained on the sidelines despite Saddam Hussein's extensive
efforts to escalate. Likewise, the Soviet Union remained
quiet, as other, more pressing domestic difficulties turned
its attention inward. Finally, maintenance of support for
the Gulf War was, in essence, moot because of the shortness
of the campaign.
In contrast, while the situation in what was once
Yugoslavia remains dynamic, for illustrative purposes this
study will separate potential operations into two forms: a
limited humanitarian aid mission and a large-scale
peacekeeping or law-and-order operation. Considering
humanitarian aid, a clearcut goal definition seems
relatively easy to achieve. Likewise, a consensus among the
domestic elite seems possible, especially considering the
past successes and working relationship between President
Bush and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Powell. Humanitarian aid is inherently a part of American
liberal values, which bodes well for domestic popular
support. At the international elite level, there has been
at least partial support for humanitarian efforts; this
partial support causes the decision-making model to conclude
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that an effort by at least a regional organization is
appropriate. However, concerning global mass dissension,
while most of the world either supports or is indifferent to
a humanitarian aid effort, recent attacks on peacekeepers
and humanitarian workers, including the shootdown of an
Italian cargo aircraft at the beginning of September, point
out that support does not exist within the region itself
(for more information on humanitarian aid issues, please
refer to Chapter II) . This lack of popular support within
the region severely reduces the likelihood of wholesale
United States military participation in a humanitarian
operation. As mentioned in Chapter II, humanitarian
operations inherently require a strictly defensive posture
and at least the tacit consent of the conflicting parties.
(Interestingly, partial U.S. military participation,
supporting a regional humanitarian effort with naval or air
forces, seems to fulfill all the requirements of the
decision-making model.) However, from the United States 's
viewpoint, a massive participation in a humanitarian
operation in the ex-Yugoslavian territories does not seem
prudent at this time.
Considering the option of participating in a massive
peacekeeping or law and order operation, and assuming a
clearcut goal definition was found which allowed for NCA
consensus, it seems unlikely that the mission would receive
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the support of Congress and, hence, the domestic
populace. 16 Without their support, the decision-making
model concludes that "nooperation" is prudent.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter II, Typology of United. Nations Military
Operations, examined the broad spectrum of military
operations that may be conducted under the auspices of the
United Nations. Each different level presented—level 1,
humanitarian aid; level 2, separation of forces; level 3,
law and order; level 4, use of limited force; level 5,
enforcement; and level 6, punishment for violations of
agreements/resolutions--has unique implications for the
decision-maker. These implications have complicated the
decision-making process since the inception of the United
Nations and will continue to limit any U.S. military
activity under its auspices.
As a rule, the operations at the extremes of the
spectrum (humanitarian aid, enforcement and punishment for
violations of agreements/resolutions) , offer the United
States and other permanent members of the Security Council
the best opportunities for direct military participation.
The legal, moral and psychological aspects of intervention
16 For an entertaining examination of events leading to
congressional support for Desert Storm, please refer to Bob
Woodward's The Commanders (Ref . 34)
.
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are less relevant; additionally, the extreme examples of
United Nations intervention offer the United States a better
opportunity to define clearly a goal for the operation.
When the role of the military is located somewhere
between these extremes, action by secondary industrialized
powers is probably more appropriate and the use of the U.S.
military should be reconsidered. Besides having the
experience and culture associated with peacekeeping
operations, the secondary industrialized powers likely will
not be perceived as having neo-colonialist or imperialist
ambitions by most of the General Assembly.
Chapter III, Model for U.S. Decision-Making, provides a
model to consider whether a given scenario is best handled
by a collective or unilateral security operation. The
United Nations is the focus of this study; an examination of
regional security organizations is beyond its scope.
However, this study's criteria are universal enough to
determine whether a given regional security organization
should act upon a crisis.
It would be naive indeed to assert that this crude model
accounts for every factor involved in an intervention
decision. Military activity does not occur in a vacuum;
diplomatic and legal proceedings also play a vital role.
[Ref. 35; 16] Much has been written about the missions of
the U.S. military, and much has been written about U.N.
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peacekeeping operations. But comparatively little
literature exists on the relationship between the United
States and United Nations collective security operations.
This study's decision-making model, as illustrated by the
Iraqi and Yugoslavian examples, provides a link between the
United States and United Nations. Additionally, this study
provides a base upon which future academics may build,
particularly in the next chapter which will examine




IV. THE U.S. NAVY IN UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS
Increasingly, U.S. forces will be called upon to provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief both at home
and abroad. As one of the few nations in the world with
the means to rapidly and effectively respond to
disaster, many nations depend on us for assistance.
Colin Powell, 1992
Earlier, this study concluded that the more moderate
United Nations military requirements are best filled by
moderate powers, and it is in the United States 's best
interests to participate—when participating at all--in the
extreme forms of United Nations military operations:
humanitarian aid and resolution enforcement /punishment
.
Interestingly, the U.S. Navy is uniquely suited to
participate in these types of operations. In general, the
U.S. Navy's potential role in United Nations operations may
be separated into three categories: logistics support,
enforcement of sanctions, and participation in punitive
measures
.
Before discussing these categories, however, it is
important to note several presumptions this study makes
regarding naval forces and the United Nations. First, for
the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that there will be a
standing United Nations naval force. As noted in one of the
interviews conducted for this study, although the Soviet
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Union and the Russian Federation apparently have made
informal overtures to the United States regarding collective
naval operations, for the time being these are not supported
by the United States for many reasons, not least being the
immense expense that would burden the United States 's
budget. [Ref. 37]
A. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
Traditionally, one of the primary missions of the U.S.
Navy has been sea control, keeping the sea lines of
communication open. The massive military-industrial
potential of the United States 's helping its allies halt (or
contain) the advance of an enemy force ensured victory in
World War II and contributed to victory in the Cold War.
While the problems of maintaining this traditional form
of sea control have become less worrisome in recent years,
in the context of United Nations operations, sea control
remains important, albeit in an altered form. Whereas the
historical meaning of sea control implied command of the
sea, in other words being able to extend a force over great
distances and wide areas, in the future sea control may come
to mean extending the U.S. force over time. "The idea of
majestically sweeping and commanding the seas has
passed. . . . [However,] exerting temporary control (air,
submarine and surface) in an area while moving ships into
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position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas
forces" [Ref. 35; 118] is precisely the type of operation
required by United Nations forces engaged in either level 5
or level 6 operations. The reason "U.N. 'emergency' forces
tend to become semipermanent is because there are so many
semipermanent emergencies." [Ref. 30; 20] Therefore, naval
forces are well-suited to maintain a long-term continuous
presence in a region not yet ready (or no longer
appropriate) for traditional forms of peacekeeping.
Regarding the three types of humanitarian assistance--
host nation's extending the invitation for assistance,
assistance given against the wishes of host, and where civil
authority has evaporated--this study concluded that only in
the first case should the U.S. deploy ground forces.
However, it is conceivable that participation in any of the
three categories could require a standby naval force to
protect humanitarian efforts, including those of the
International Red Cross. And, although ground forces seem
best deployed only when there is an invitation for
assistance, naval forces are suited for involvement in
circumstances that are less than ideal. As Resolution 713
(1991) on Yugoslavia notes, if the Security Council's
"primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations [is] for the maintenance of international peace and
security," [Ref. 38; 1] and, if threats to peace and
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security may include those not specifically relating to a
nation's sovereignty, then that responsibility also includes
all "practical steps to tackle the critical needs of the
people of Yugoslavia, including displaced persons and the





39; 3] The current United Nations Security Council debate
on providing "all means necessary" for humanitarian efforts
suggests naval forces already have an important role to play
in interventionist humanitarian efforts planned under United
Nations auspices. One can easily project a future when the
"all means necessary" include not only naval support for
humanitarian efforts, but also providing able bodies for
"hands on" assistance on land. In this event, it seems U.S.
Navy personnel should--like their ground force counter-
parts—only participate when the host government has
extended an invitation for assistance.
During Desert Shield and Storm, U.S. naval forces were
ready to provide vital escort to Military Sealift Command
(MSC) units to ensure the arrival of supplies necessary for
the collective security effort. Furthermore, naval forces
17 This is quoted from Security Council Resolution 724
(1991), adopted on 15 December 1991 in response to Secretary-
General Perez de Cuellar's 11 December report which concluded
that the conditions for establishing a peacekeeping operation
in disintegrating Yugoslavia did not yet exist. In other
words, although the disputants were not ready to allow for
peacekeeping, the Security Council was beginning to pave the
way for human rights efforts.
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can support units furnishing humanitarian aid in crisis
areas. Not only able to respond quickly to emerging crises,
U.S. Navy assets are uniquely able to maintain a continuous
presence in virtually any littoral area in order to provide
logistics support for a humanitarian or combat effort, as
well as provide the teeth required to put a bite into United
Nations 's resolutions involving arms embargoes or sanctions.
B. ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS
In this study's decision-making model, there was a
distinction made between unilateral and collective security
efforts. For the U.S. Navy, its assets are uniquely
prepared to act in both security categories. Because of the
nature of naval warfare, sovereign nations' ships (for
instance, two destroyers, one a Sovremennyy and the other a
Spruance) are readily identifiable as belonging to a
specific nation-state. Of course, with patrol craft and
other smaller units that may be the main actors in a
littoral/regional conflict, identification is more
difficult. But even with the proliferation of small and
inexpensive coastal defense platforms to many third world
countries, quick and accurate visual recognition of nation-
state naval combatants is easily conducted with little prior
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training. 18 In other words, naval warfare under a
collective umbrella still retains a uniquely large amount of
"unilateralness .
"
The Foundations and Principles portion of the current
National Military Strategy of the United States highlights
the following dilemma:
"While we emphasize multinational operations under the
auspices of international bodies such as the United
Nations, we must retain the capability to act
unilaterally when and where U.S. interests dictate.
This new strategy is, in many ways, more complex than
the containment strategy of the Cold War era." [Ref. 40;
6]
If flexibility is the key to acting correctly in this
complex era, then naval forces are uniquely flexible. While
efforts are occurring to garner domestic and international
consensus for an operation, naval forces are able to arrive
on station rapidly and then await either unilateral or
collective action without having to change drastically the
nature of their mission. Besides being able to conduct
unilateral or collective missions, naval forces are also
flexible in the types of operations to be conducted. For
18 Recognition of surface platforms is simpler and easier
than of ground hardware or even aircraft. In addition to
having identifying features inherent to the platform itself,
naval units legally must fly a national flag or naval ensign.
While aircraft and ground hardware have identifying markings,




example, naval forces currently located in the Adriatic not
only are able to participate in the arms embargo of
Yugoslavia under Resolution 713 (1991) [Ref. 38; 3], but
with relatively little effort they also may participate in
operations resulting from new Security Council resolutions
concerning interventionist humanitarianism.
In Navies and Foreign Policy , Ken Booth discusses the
flexibility (in his terms, "ambiguity") of maintaining a
naval presence overseas:
Certainly in any relationship between a relatively
stronger and a relatively weaker state, the weaker
always faces the difficulty of trying to disassociate
the promise of possible benefits, the threat of possible
sanctions, or a danger of a withdrawal of support. . . .
[This is due to] the relative subtlety of the stages
through which a warship can be transformed from a
platform for a dance-band and cavorting local
dignitaries, to a haven of refuge for nationals in
distress, to a gun-platform for shore bombardment.
[Ref. 35; 27]
He considers this ambiguity a potential problem; in
collective security operations, when escalation of a crisis
may require an international consensus not yet possible, a
unilateral naval presence can fulfill multiple missions
before these missions are even openly articulated.
C. PUNITIVE MEASURES
Naval forces are uniquely capable of participating in
the full range of punitive uses of collective force, from
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conducting a single air strike or Tomahawk launch to
participating in the all-out invasion of a nation. If the
biggest threat currently facing the United States is "the
unknown, the uncertain (,) " [Ref. 40; 4] then it is a good
bet that the future environment in which military operations
occur will likely not be as clearcut as Desert Shield and
Storm. While, at least according to The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, fears of a regional crisis vertically and
horizontally escalating into a global nuclear conflagration
are lower than at any time since World War II, still a local
crisis could conceivably escalate up the ladder of
operations discussed in Chapter II of this study. For
example, a failed level 2 separation of forces operation
could result in hostilities that require a level 3 law and
order operation by United Nations forces. Successive
miscues or failures could eventually lead to level 6
punishment operations. With a little imagination, one may
even envision a scenario in which deploying additional
United Nations forces to an area could lead to an
inadvertent escalation of a local conflict. However, naval
forces, especially U.S. Navy forces with a history of
forward presence and routine operations in an area, may be
deployed to a region without unduly escalating the level of
the conflict. As stated in the National Military Strategy
of the United States , "Forward presence forces conducting
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operational and training deployments are often the most
responsive in cases of natural disaster or regional crisis."
[Ref. 40; 14] Likewise, additional naval forces, under the
guise of an exercise or turnover operation also may be
deployed with relatively little evidence of escalation.
A final point on the utility of naval forces in
collective security operations is that the risk in using
naval forces, typically at a standoff distance from land
hostilities, is much lower than in using ground forces or
even aircraft . Perhaps the image from Desert Storm that
will last longest in the minds of national and international
decision-makers is of a Tomahawk cruise missile effortlessly
flying down the center of an Iraqi street, untouched, on
target, and with no potential loss of American lives.
To illustrate the difficulties inherent in risking the
use of force within a collective security operation, this
study will use Donald Nuechterlein' s "National Interest
Matrix," (Figure 4.1) that separates the intensity of
national interests into four categories: survival, vital,
major, and peripheral. [Ref. 41; 29]
A survival interest "exists when the physical existence
of a country is in jeopardy . . . ." A vital interest
exists "when serious harm to the nation would result unless
strong measures, including the use of force, are employed to











and peripheral interests are such that some of the country's
well-being or interests are at stake, but the use of armed
force "is not deemed necessary to avoid adverse outcomes."
[Ref. 41; 29]
Historically, the vast majority of United Nations
military efforts have concerned the United States 's major or
peripheral interests but not its survival or vital
interests. Now, it appears that the United States will be
playing a more active role in these military operations.
Therefore, it is perhaps most appropriate to use naval
forces, minimizing the risks to U.S. military personnel
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while also remaining a responsible partner in the collective
security arena.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Although it appears that the vast majority of United
Nations operations do not directly affect the United
States 's survival or vital interests, simultaneously the
country is examining potentially new roles for its military
in the collective security arena. The U.S. Navy is
particularly suited to conduct a variety of operations
within the United Nations framework, including logistics
support, enforcement of sanctions, and participation in
punitive measures. Moreover, the use of naval force
minimizes risk, which is especially important when the
operations are only of major or peripheral interest to the
country; reduces the possibility of inadvertent escalation;
and transitions easily between unilateral and collective
operations
.
If the threat is "instability and being unprepared to
handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected,
"
[Ref. 41; 4] then it seems that the United States, as the
only nation with the military capability to influence events
globally, must remain capable of reacting quickly and
effectively to regional crises. The U.S. Navy, with its
forward presence overseas, is uniquely capable of responding
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even when a large-scale United Nations military operation is
not necessary or possible. Current plans for stationing
2,100 U.S. Marines off Somalia to support the international
relief effort is a perfect example.
Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community may play an
increasing role in collective security operations. The next
chapter examines the implications of the intelligence
community's participation in the spectrum of United Nations
military operations.
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V. U.S. INTELLIGENCE'S ROLE IN U.N. OPERATIONS
The unprecedented scope and pace of change in today's
world--and the increasing number of actors now able to
threaten global peace--highlight the need for reliable
information and a sophisticated understanding of events
and trends. The global reach of American intelligence
capabilities is a unique national asset, crucial not
only to our own security, but also to our leadership
role in responding to international challenges.
President Bush, 1991
In his National Security Strategy of the United States
1991-1992 , President Bush briefly discusses intelligence
programs. He outlines several important issues:
the turbulence of change itself demands that we monitor
events and assess prospects for the future . . .
regional turmoil will place growing burdens on
intelligence collection, processing and analysis. At
the same time, we must track the threats posed by
narcotics trafficking, terrorism and the proliferation
of advanced weapons. We must also be more fully aware
of international financial, trade and technology trends
that could affect the security of the United States,
including its economic well-being. [Ref. 1; 63]
Monitoring political and military events to encourage
regional stability may be the types of missions envisioned
by the drafters of the Charter of the United Nations.
However, as mentioned earlier, the threats to stability
appear to be changing toward those that transcend not only
sovereign borders, but also military affairs. It is
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interesting to note that virtually all of the threats
President Bush mentions at the top of this chapter are non-
military matters. Narcotics trafficking and the
proliferation of advanced weapons may be considered largely
economic issues, as are the financial, trade and technology
trends; terrorism arguably is a political issue (or at least
an untraditional military issue) . Considering that Third
World nations are most concerned with foreign intrusion into
their domestic economic and political affairs and the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are
probably most concerned with compliance and verification of
resolutions, the essential dilemma concerning collective
intelligence efforts is quite understandable. [Ref. 42; 2]
From the viewpoint of the United States, using a
sovereign or unilateral intelligence capability in a way
that jeopardizes its national security interests is highly
unlikely to occur. Likewise, giving up national control of
U.S. intelligence assets to an international intelligence
organization also seems highly unlikely. Therefore, just as
this study presumes that no international standing force of
troops will be initiated, so too this study presumes that
any attempt to initiate an international intelligence
agency, something along the lines of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, is at best a distant possibility.
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For the purposes of this study, the six levels of United
Nations military operations, ranging in intensity from
humanitarian aid to enforcement of United Nations Security
Council resolutions and punishment, also will be used to
examine the potential multinational uses of U.S.
intelligence assets. In general, it appears that the
reasons the U.S. military should not involve itself in level
2 through level 4 United Nations operations (level 2,
separation of forces; level 3, law and order; and level 4,
use of limited force) become muddied when considering U.S.
intelligence operations. On one hand, there are numerous
reasons the United States can defend the use of its national
intelligence assets for a multinational audience in a
variety of operations. First, as mentioned, "secondary"
sorts of military operations seem best suited for
"secondary" powers; however, "secondary" powers do not have
the intelligence collection capabilities of the United
States. Second, if the primary reason the United States
does not desire to participate in a collective security
operation is that the risk is too high for the major or
peripheral interests at stake, then "space-based systems,
high above the earth . . . can carry out surveillance tasks
quickly, effectively and efficiently with little risk, even
in a crisis." [Ref. 43; 101]
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On the other hand, there seem equally as many valid
reasons for the United States not to provide information to
an international audience. For example, if the primary-
reason the United States does not participate in a United
Nations miltary action is due to fears of a Third World
backlash against "Big Brother" neo-colonialist intervention,
then providing overhead intelligence collection for the
United Nations may be perceived as even more interventionist
than sending ground troops. Currently, however, precedents
set with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N.
Special Commission on Iraq suggest the United States
intelligence community can safely share classified
information and equipment (including a U-2) on a case-by-
case basis, provided the heads of such international
agencies remain discreet about their use. Ambassador Rolf
Ekeus is the executive chairman of the Special Commission on
Iraq, the United Nations organization mandated to oversee
the implementation of the Security Council's Gulf War
ceasefire resolutions calling for the elimination of Iraq's
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic
missiles with ranges over 150 kilometers, along with
production capabilities. In a recent interview, he stated,
We have to verify that permitted activities, whether in
the civil industry or the military, are not used as
cover for the development of prohibited weapons. And we
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will have means for that. There will be high-altitude
observation, with the help of our U-2 aircraft.
[Ref. 44; 8]
Interestingly, his statement suggests other, unstated means
of intelligence support to the commission.
As a means to verify arms control agreements and
Security Council resolutions, overhead intelligence systems
have already proved to be invaluable. Space-based
intelligence platforms can lend a certain amount of
stability and assurance, especially in areas of chronic
tension. Such capabilities can also reduce the
possibilities of surprise attack and thus reduce the
tendencies towards escalation of crises. Therefore, in a
future where the United Nations is likely to take a more
proactive role in ensuring regional stability, coalition
forces undoubtedly will employ the entire spectrum of
intelligence assets as force multipliers for their forces
conducting level 1 through level 6 operations.
The levels of conflict (level 1, humanitarian aid; level
5, enforcement; and level 6, punishment for violations of
agreements/resolutions) , in which the U.S. military already
has risked ground forces, will continue to be suited for the
multilateral sharing of U.S. intelligence assets. But, as a
rule, those intelligence missions that intrude into a
sovereign nation's economic and political concerns seem best
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suited to the U.S.'s unilateral monitoring and not a
collective effort. Multinational intelligence efforts,
especially in this era of "the proliferation of space-based
surveillance" systems [ref. 43; 94], while potentially
lucrative, require strict consideration of the implications
of the effort. Publicity and media coverage are two factors
that are likely to increase when national intelligence
disseminates to an international audience. Moreover, the
possibility that an intelligence source will be compromised
is also likely to grow- -although, regarding data received
from overhead sensors, compromise of a source seems less
relevant. (A human collecting information against a target
nation seems easier to counter than an overhead sensor.)
However, one may imagine that a target nation's knowledge of
effective overhead intelligence monitoring by the U.S. or a
multinational body could complicate future intelligence
collection efforts against that target.
A. HUMANITARIAN AID
While intelligence assets--in particular, meteorological
satellites--clearly have a role to play in providing warning
of natural disasters, perhaps more importantly overhead
sensors may be used for man-made environmental disasters.
"With the decrease in tensions between the superpowers and
the broadening of the definition of national security, their
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national space assets may be increasingly diverted to
monitor the environment, producing images of oil slicks, air
pollution and natural disasters." [Ref. 43; 103] Several
examples exist: the most obvious of which may be the
Chernobyl incident, in which the United States, monitoring
Soviet military and civilian communications and using
satellite imagery, was "able to assess the extent of the
damage to the Chernobyl reactor within hours of its
detection." [Ref. 43; 103] Another example is the
monitoring effort of the environmental damage resulting from
the Gulf War.
B. LEVEL 2 THROUGH LEVEL 4 OPERATIONS
While it is unwise to say that the United States will
never provide intelligence support to these mid-level
operations, so too it seems unwise to predict that the U.S.
should always provide information to operations sanctioned
by the Security Council. Perhaps the most useful way to
describe this category of intelligence sharing is that the
United States must review this issue on a case-by-case
basis. Means of deciding may be based on the relative
merits of the case, the importance, capability and viability
of the United States intelligence collection effort for a
particular crisis, and the likelihood of source compromise.
Additionally, U.S. decision-makers may consider the
85
effects of intelligence dissemination on media coverage of
the crisis and public support for the operation. As
mentioned in Chapter III, international consensus is
essential for the continuation of collective security
operations, and information provided by the United States
intelligence community may have a direct impact on the often
fickle feelings of the international populace. For example,
release of several violent Bomb Damage Assessment videotapes
during the Gulf War actually helped allay public fears of
unacceptable levels of collateral damage and civilian
casualties. Similarly, information regarding Iraqi air
activity may alter public perceptions of current U.S. and
U.N. operations in the Arabian Gulf.
C. INTELLIGENCE AND U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Level 5 enforcement and its follow-on, level 6
punishment for violations of agreements, do not seem to need
a detailed discussion in this study except for a few points.
Just as warriors through the ages have desired the
advantages inherent in gaining the high ground, so too
overhead intelligence assets may be the difference between
defeat and victory. While a recent article that said the
Gulf War "marks the first time American satellites have been
placed on a wartime footing" [Ref. 43; 95] was perhaps
forgetting the role played by the U.S. intelligence
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community in operations from Vietnam to Just Cause,
nevertheless, surveillance capabilities in space, combined
with U.S. ground and air assets, did provide coalition
forces a very great advantage over the Iraqis. The "largest
fleet of watching satellites ever assembled" [Ref. 43; 95]
constructed a web of sensors around and over Iraq, thereby
creating a tripwire of warning and providing a highly
effective force multiplier. The force multiplication effect
of intelligence assets may be particularly crucial in future
level 5 and level 6 United Nations military operations--
especially considering the apparently inevitable disarmament
pressures gaining momentum across the globe.
As in the past and present, the United Nations 's future
military operations necessarily will be constrained by moral
issues. Therefore, a valuable lesson from the Gulf War is
that the accuracy of precision-guided munitions such as the
Tomahawk was due in no small part to extensive
reconnaissance satellite imagery. This accuracy enabled
coalition forces to limit the collateral damage to civilians
in Iraq and Kuwait in some instances, "a very important
political consideration during the air and land war." [Ref.
43; 96] Concurrently, the massive strategic bombing
campaign severely disrupted the Iraqi infrastructure, an
occurrence unlike any since World War II, the full effects
of which are probably still not completely understood by
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military planners. In any case, the extensive means allowed
the coalition force seems highly unlikely to occur under
future United Nations military operations. As Weiss and
Chopra conclude, "Given the unexpected scale of the
engagement that followed (the approval for allowing 'all
necessary means')/ it is unlikely that the international
community will write another blank check of this kind."
[Ref. 17; 29]
D. CONCLUSIONS
If the end of the zero-sum Cold War meant that "what was
good for one superpower was no longer automatically
considered bad for the other," [Ref. 45; 35] then the number
of agreements concerning new United Nations 's military
operations is likely to grow. This chapter has already
pointed out the importance of maintaining the high ground in
military operations. In collective security operations, in
which it is required that the multinational force be seen as
a moral and humane force, it may be decisive that the force
also maintains the moral "high ground." U.S. intelligence
community participation in United Nations military
operations can be a decisive factor in ensuring that
international consensus does not ebb and that military
operations are as efficient and humane as practical.
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VI. CONCLUSION
During the last half-century, the single applicable
document most subscribed to by mankind has been
represented by the United Nations Charter.
Martin van Creveld
While Mr. van Creveld may have been correct in his
recent Parameters article, unfortunately the nearly half-
century life of the United Nations has often been
characterized by inactivity and stalemate. "Still, there
were many occasions when the Council condemned aggression in
general terms, ordered cease-fires (often with success), and
sent armed forces operating under its auspices to observe
and, as far as possible, enforce those cease-fires." [Ref.
45; 35] The rise to power in the Soviet Union of Mikhail
Gorbachev, followed by the end of the Cold War, has led to a
more multipolar world which, paradoxically, has made it more
likely that Security Council consensus may be reached,
except in circumstances which directly conflict with one of
the permanent members' vital interests.
As the United Nations Security Council looks to resolve
regional crises ranging from humanitarian issues to punitive
measures resulting from the failure of a member nation to
heed the Council's resolutions, the U.S. and its military
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must consider the implications of its participation in these
operations. The majority of United Nations member countries
will continue to have a Third World perspective, wary of
subtle (or not subtle) threats to their international
prestige and national sovereignty, yet eager to achieve and
maintain the stability needed for steady economic growth.
For the U.S., the world's last remaining superpower, the
situation may be especially tricky. While its role as the
world's leader may indeed be, in President Bush's phrase,
based on trust; it is also true that trust is as strong as
the last time faith was put to the test. Therefore, it is
imperative the United States, to maintain its position in
the world, use its power prudently.
Prudent use of power means using power only when it is
needed. For the United States, the primary military power
in the world, this use of power means participating in
United Nations operations only when primary power is needed.
As mentioned in the introduction to this study, recent
initiatives relating to Yugoslavia, Somalia and Cambodia
point to a future that will include even more intense and
varied United Nations military operations. This study began







3 Law and Order
4. Use of Limited Force
5 Enforcement
6. Punishment for Violations of Agreements/Resolutions
These levels, of course, will never be as clearcut in
reality as they may seem on paper. The United States, with
interests and obligations that span the globe, also may not
always have the opportunity for clear distinctions in its
military operations. In these "gray areas," in which the
major or peripheral interests of the United States may not
readily outweigh the risks involved, maximum flexibility in
force applied seems vital. In these cases, it seems that
using naval forces as a means to provide forward presence,
symbolize political support and, at the same time, ensure a
large degree of "unilateralness" to an operation will help
make the best of a potentially disastrous situation.
Regarding the sharing of intelligence, the United States
seems best suited for providing information during
operations in which it also plays an active role at the
point of crisis: humanitarian operations and enforcement of
and punishment for violating United Nations resolutions.
During the mid-level operations, the rules are less clear.
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Intelligence sharing requires a large degree of
sophistication and discretion on the part of the
international organization. Recent examples such as the
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq provides a hopeful
sign for the future. In any case, it seems prudent to
review each future instance of intelligence sharing on a
case-by-case basis.
The full impact of the Gulf War on the United Nations
will be better understood in the future. Still, it seems
apparent that this event "will one day be regarded, if not
as a critical turning point, at any rate as a modest
milestone on the highway of change." [Ref. 45; 36]
Traditionally, sovereign nations are often characterized by
three powers: to impose taxes, to make law, and to make
war. [Ref. 45] Taking a very long view, it is possible that
these powers of the state may pass to an international
organization such as the United Nations. However, it is a
presumption of this study that any significant amendments to
the Charter of the United Nations are beyond the horizon.
Therefore, the United States 's power in the organization
will likely remain as is. In Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Powell's words, "While we emphasize
multinational operations under the auspices of international
bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the
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capability to act unilaterally when and where U.S. interests
dictate." [Ref. 15; 6]
If the United States 's new military strategy is built on
the four foundations of Strategic Deterrence and Defense,
Forward Presense, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution, which
require "the capability and flexibility to support a
spectrum of response options," [Ref. 15; 6] then this
spectrum includes useful cooperation with the United
Nations. Collective defense reduces the burdens of defense
spending and unnecessary arms competitions, ensures
continued ties with friends and allies, and helps reassure
developing nations. Reusing Churchill's description of
democracy, collective security may be "the worst possible
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